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A turn of the century religious revival 
In 1985, Marcel Gauchet published Le désenchantement du monde [The disenchantment 
of the world].  In the wake of his analysis, two generations of political and social 
scientists working in the field of religion have added their weight to the theory of the 
inexorable “secularization” of contemporary societies, according to which 
modernization “negatively” entails a decline in religion as a cultural source for society 
and as a structuring framework for behavior and “positively” allows for the deployment 
of critical thinking, concerted democratic choices and individualized life-styles.  Today, 
these same political and social scientists of religion seem to be back-peddling.  To give 
an example of this, in 2001 the French edition of a book edited by the American scholar 
Peter Berger bore a symptomatic title: Le réenchantement du monde [The re-
enchantment of the world], a retrospective allusion to the work of Marcel Gauchet.  The 
underlying argument of the book, the fruit of numerous investigations, some of them 
French, is that our epoch has become “furiously” religious (this is the term that Berger 
uses), and that the predictions linked to the inexorability of secularization have been 
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shown to be erroneous.  Accelerated modernization has, on the contrary, engendered a 
movement of extremely acute counter-secularization – a movement which has 
propagated itself rapidly given the speed of media interconnections, their technological 
power, the increasing intermingling/cross-fertilization of populations, their 
deterritorialization which, in some ways, has provoked the birth of a post-modern 
spiritual nomadism, in part due to economic migrations in which over ten years, more 
than 50 million people have migrated across the world – a figure that is truly staggering.   
 
French researchers such as Guy Michelat1 have on the one hand highlighted the strong 
dilution of Catholic identity in France, including that pertaining to “political influence”, 
while at the same time noting the paradox of a phenomenon of impregnation which 
makes it impossible to conclude that there is no real Catholic perspective, either in 
general or with reference to political questions in particular. In a sense, Catholics are 
now everywhere instead of nowehere. The Catholic religion is still dominant in terms of 
the identity to which people in France say they “belong” – 64% of French people refer to 
themselves as Catholics in a CSA-La Vie survey of December 2004, and in the Le Monde 
des religions-CSA survey of June 2005, 78% believe that human beings have an essential 
need for religions. This religious affiliation still affects electoral behavior, and plays a 
part in major societal debates.  Also, it turns out that a minority characterized by Guy 
Michelat as “undiluted”2 retain a strong internal religious cohesion (through faith, 
religious practice, and the transmission of these things) simultaneously with strong 
political and social orientations which they are determined to defend. In the final 
analysis, therefore, a Catholic presence in contemporary political debates is still 
perceptible. As Italian historian Giancarlo Zizola writes, that presence is no longer such 
as to give “power a conscience” but continues, in a toned-down form, to ensure that 
“conscience has a degree of power.”3   
                                                 
1
 Guy Michelat, Julien Poter, Jacques Sutter, Les Français sont-ils encore catholiques ? Cerf, 1991, 332p. 
and by the same authors, L’héritage chrétien en disgrâce, L’Harmattan, 2003, 335p. 
2
 I.e., those who feel that the terms “Catholic”, “believer”, “Christian”, and “one who practices religion” 
define them very well. 
3
 In Le Successeur, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer,1995, p.18. 
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The “solubility” of Catholics in French politics: 
 
Numerical weakening and evanescence of Catholics 
 
If we return to the general idea of an absence of Catholic specificity in contemporary 
political debates, a primary cause of this would no doubt be the substantial numerical 
weakening of Catholics, accompanied by a transformation in their sense of belonging 
which means that, when t see themselves as Catholics, they do so only in an extremely 
diluted fashion4.  On a great many points, Catholic specificity has disappeared, and 
Catholics today are hardly distinguishable from the rest of the French population. 
 
Widespread rejection of Catholic norms on sexual and family matters  
 
In a December 2003 BVA survey on laïcité, it is quite noteworthy that 46% of those 
questioned felt that the Catholic Church was acting within its role when intervening in 
cultural questions, while 45% were of the opposite view.  Some 44% felt the church was 
entitled to intervene on economic and social questions, while 44% were of a contrary 
opinion.  However, 60% considered that the church was over-stepping its role when 
taking positions on moral questions (such as abortion, sexuality and procreation).  Some 
73% felt that homosexuality was an acceptable way of living one’s sexuality, and 67% 
felt that the adoption of the PACS (civil unions for homosexuals) did not endanger the 
family as an institution. These responses to questions which might at first sight appear 
out of place in an opinion survey on laïcité suggest that sexuality and procreation are 
considered as falling within the domain of laicité in France, that, like the political sphere, 
they are quite separate from religion, indeed one might say that they are regarded as 
purely “political”.  
Secular integration 
 
French Catholics appear perfectly integrated in the general structure of French society, 
and recognize as their own that which for over a century was the bête noire of their 
                                                 
4
 Michelat defines four categories of Catholics: weekly, monthly, occasional, and non-practicing in 
Comportement électoral des catholiques, Dictionnaire du Vote, PUF, 2001, pp.160-163. 
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religious leaders, i.e the Republic and its secular foundations, reflected in the 
functioning of its institutions and the content of may be regarded as a kind of civil 
religion5. Laïcité has become the cultural norm for French Catholics.  In her analysis of a 
2003 BVA survey6, Martine Barthélemy has shown that the attachment of Catholics to 
laïcité is as strong as among “other” French people.   
 
Although the survey shows that 45% of respondents still consider that an opposition 
exists between the France of Catholic tradition and the France of laïcité (compared with 
47% who feel that opposition is now definitively gone), the remainder of the responses 
demonstrate that this is more a question of old conflicts than of everyday realities 
today. On these matters, Catholic opinion is in fact broadly in line that of the general 
population: 61% of those surveyed believed that laïcité still has to be fought for, 67% 
believed that laïcité was threatened (of these 82% believed that it was threatened by 
Islam), and 87% believed that laicité was a fundamental value, with 64% of people being 
against reserving time for religious instruction in the school system, 65% being hostile to 
chaplainships in public school establishments, 84% believing that the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf in public schools is intolerable, 60% being against the taking into 
account of religious convictions in school cantines, 81% feeling that religion is not 
necessary to conduct oneself appropriately, 57% believing that laïcité is a shield against 
religious intolerance, 79% feeling that the separation between churches and the State - 
according to which churches do not intervene in political life, and the State does not 
intervene in the life of churches - was “satisfactory in France”, 53% believing that the 
State should not intervene in any way in religion (while 92% demanded that the state 
ban “sects”), and overwhelming majorities believing that religious practice is a strictly 
private affair, that the State is the most legitimate institution to defend republican 
                                                 
5
 As Françoise Subileau puts it, laicité constitutes a code of political interpretation that is “less a body of 
constituted doctrine, than a system of political organization and perception – an interpretative and 
explanatory code for viewing the world” in La laïcité une valeur d’aujourd’hui, Contestations et 
renégociations du modèle français, sous la direction de Philippe Portier, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 
2001, article Les militants socialistes et la laïcité, p. 175.  
6
 Martine Barthélémy, Les Français et la Laïcité, Final report, CEVIPOF, octobre 2004 
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values and the Rights of Man, and that those rights are the most important legacy of the 
French Revolution just ahead of equality, public education, the Constitution and laïcité.    
 
A softer secularism 
 
In the same way that Catholics have “blended into” the values of the Republic, French 
people in general –87% of whom declare that laïcité is a fundamental value – have 
ceased being distrustful or resentful towards Catholicism.  The great conflicts of old are 
now gone.  Anti-clericalism, the cement of secular thinking, has almost disappeared 
from French consciousness in parallel with the disappearance of religious culture.  To 
offer some examples from the BVA survey of 2003: 73% of French people are in favor of 
the teaching of religious history in schools, and one can surmise that Catholics and other 
people of religious background support this out of self-interest, while non-religious 
people do so believing it help them by distancing students from religions, with the two 
situations converging perfectly to avoid the development of intolerance; 66% of people 
are favorable to public holidays or religious festivals (notably Christian festivals), 73% 
consider that laïcité is the only way for people of different convictions to live together, 
47% think that the State is right to finance private religious schools, 29% and 28% think 
that private schools and the Catholic church do not threaten laïcité a great deal, and the 
remainder do not think that these threaten laïcité at all, 61% think that the word 
“religion” evokes something positive (though it also true that the word “atheism” is 
considered as positive by 48% of those surveyed), and finally, 63% agree that laïcité is a 
tradition which today must seek to renew its identity. And in that process of 
redefinition, 60% consider that is acceptable for members of the government to 
participate in religious ceremonies, and 43% agree with local authorities providing 
financial support for places of worship. 
 
We can see here at first hand part of the “lost reference points” frequently deplored by 
French intellectual and the media.  From a country that was clearly divided into two 
camps, which knew themselves very well and drew on their reciprocal hatred in order to 
exist, has emerged a country in which each camp is penetrated by the ideas of its 
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firmest enemy, constructing a vague consensus which fills politicians with despair.This 
catho-secular consensus is now in fact the nation’s current cultural identity.  
 
The disappearance of Catholic and Christian-Democrat political culture 
 
In this confusing debacle the responsibility of French Catholics is considerable.  As much 
as the march of secularization, the evolution of their own church and the political 
circumstances of the post-War period have all contributed to their “political 
absorption”. 
 
With the advent of the Second World War, the disintegration of the conservative parties 
towards which Catholics had traditionally gravitated, the discrediting of Third Republic 
who voted for the death of that régime in 1940, paving the way for the Vichy regime, 
the compromised status of Charles Maurras many Action Française nationalists as a 
result of collaboration between Vichy and the Nazi occupation, the legitimacy acquired 
by default by General de Gaulle, and, finally, American support all explain the 
considerable success of the Christian Democratic MRP (Mouvement Républican 
Populaire) among voters from 1945 onwards, and the arrival of its members to the 
highest positions of state.  Following the Liberation, it constituted and united together 
the dispersed groups of Christian-Democrat inspiration from the pre-War period.   
 
Pierre Letamendia’s 1995 study of the MRP explains very clearly the eventual 
disappearance of this party due the exhaustion of its goal7.  It was thanks to the MRP 
that Catholicism re-found its acceptance in French political life.  The leaders of this 
party, which in varying degrees participated in government throughout the Fourth 
Republic, achieved an impressive feat in rallying large numbers of Catholics who had up 
to this point been distrustful towards a Republic associated in their eyes with the idea of 
                                                 
7
 Disappearance is also the topic of an analysis by Jean-Luc Pouthier in the chapter Emergence et 
ambiguïté de la culture politique démocrate-chrétienne, in Les Cultures politiques en France, under the 
direction of Serge Bernstein, Points Histoire, Seuil,2003, pp.303-334.Cf also Blandine Chelini-Pont, « Le 
christianisme, référence ou alibi dans la politique française depuis 1944 », in L’héritage chrétien dans le 
patrimoine culturel français, Colloque de l’IDHC, PUAM, 1996, pp.155-185. 
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“persecution”. The men of the MRP forced the other political partners of this period –
radicals, socialists and communists – to accept, through the play of electoral politics, the 
weight of the Catholic vote within a Constitution which was presented, from the very 
beginning, as secular.  It was thus that the MRP, during its most influential phase, 
infused into French laïcité the spirit of the party’s economic ideals, notably in terms of 
the worth attached to individual human beings through the legal redistribution of 
wealth.  Amid the need to reconstruct an economy that had devastated through war, it 
supported social reforms which were directly compatible with the social doctrine of the 
church, such as the organization of Social Security, improvements in labor legislation, 
the introduction of a minimum wage, the creation of the family policy, and family 
allowances.  It also worked for the taxing of income, profits and products.  Its social 
interventionism fitted admirably with the nation’s tradition of state-led dirigisme.  State 
intervention in economic matters, the protection of trade union rights, social laws for 
the protection of the family and the promotion of the human person – all of these social 
and economic policies were, and remain, foundations of contemporary France, which 
explains why France is so reluctant to reflect on the notion that this policy of large-scale 
economic protection and intervention is perhaps the cause if its decline.   
 
The MRP was also the party of Franco-German reconciliation and European integration 
par excellence. This orientation was largely the work of Robert Schuman, a German-
speaking Alsacien, whose emphasis in this direction was not initially shared by the party 
rank and file, who were more anti-German and pro-Atlanticist in outlook, a line of 
thinking represented by Georges Bidault, for example. One only has to read the 
accounts of parliamentary debates on the ratification of the European Coal and Steel 
Community European Defence Community treaties to realize how innovative  
Schuman’s approach was and how widely misunderstood and opposed it was. The MRP 
was the party that began to calm the long-standing debate on education by trying to 
secure the position of religious schools without calling into question the existing public 
education system. Its action helped to pave the way for the recognition of educational 
freedom in the Constitution of 1958, marking the beginning of the Fifth Republic, and 
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the Debré law of 1959 on state funding for religious schools. Since the end of the MRP, 
there has been no explicitly Christian party in French politics. The Catholic electorate 
was successfully wooed by the Gaullist Party, which succeeded in presenting itself as a 
party bridging the France of the past with the France of laïcité. The voting system used 
in presidential elections under the Fifth Republic has also favored more directly 
“political” positioning by candidates without reference to their religious convictions. In 
addition, the 1960s brought a rapid decline in religious observance and a generational 
break with the traditional idea of Catholicism as a system of binding beliefs and 
behavioral rules.The “Catholic vote” was now split across the whole party spectrum, 
with all parties of both left and right now entirely secular. 8 From this point onwards, 
Catholics were no longer a unified, static bloc. A significant minority among them began 
voting on the left and to support corresponding opinions. From then on, European 
construction was no longer driven by a clear ideological motor in France, in contrast 
with the situation in other European countries, where Christian-Democratic parties 
continued to exist. 
 
  A Catholic “imprint” on French politics? 
 
The continuation of a conservative tendency 
 
Nevertheless, on the basis of data collected in 1966, Guy Michelat and Michel Simon 
were able to show that there was still, during that period of political polarization, a 
strong correlation between identifying oneself as a Catholic and voting for the right9.  
                                                 
8
 On the left vote of Catholics, see Jean-Marie Donegani, La liberté de choisir, opus cit. In this book, 
Donegani presents the models of the identity choice by Catholics, whether marginalist, integralist or 
intermediate. Pierre Bréchon in Attitudes religieuses et politiques des catholiques pratiquants;Enquête par 
questionnaire dans huit assemblées dominicales grenobloises, BDPS-IEP, 1982, Grenoble[Religious and 
political attitudes of practicing Catholics. Questionary survey in eight Sunday assemblies in Grenoble], also 
shows that practitioners engaged in religious activism vote more to the left than Catholics practising 
without commitment, which would mean that political options also correspond to specific differences in 
religious commitment, and that Catholic compassionate commitment understood as concern for the 
other-social concern drives Catholic militants to the left. 
9
 In Classe, Religion et comportement politique, Presses de la FNSP, 1977, second part, Systèmes d’opinion 
et choix politiques and fifth part Appartenance de classe, niveau d’intégration religieuse et comportement 
politique. 
 
 
9 
9 
Catholics voted more for the right  and less for the left than non-religious people, and 
this was even more the case for practicing Catholics10.  Through similar studies 
conducted in 1990 and 199711, Guy Michelat noted an erosion of this phenomenon, but 
not its disappearance.  Thus during the elections of 1997, the vote for the right (not 
including the extreme-right National Front) was 57% among weekly-practicing Catholics, 
which was 20 points lower than in 1965, 46% among monthly-practicing Catholics, 34% 
for occasionally-practicing Catholics, 20% among non-practicing Catholics, and 8% for 
non-religious voters.  Support for the left was in inverse proportion to this:  44% among 
non-religious people, 30% among non-practicing Catholics, 27% among occasionally-
practicing Catholics, 22% among monthly-practicing Catholics, and 16% among weekly-
practicing Catholics.  This negative correlation between a Catholic affiliation and support 
for the left applied to all the main parties of the left (Socialists, Communists, Greens and 
Radicals), with the Communist party particularly marked by this, as in the past.  The rate 
of abstention is particularly low among practicing Catholics (20%) and at its maximum 
among non-practicing Catholics and non-religious people (38% and 36% respectively).   
 
Michelat infers from this that interest in politics is at its greatest among Catholics 
characterized by Guy Michelet as the most “undiluted” and is lower among others who 
in the past were more inclined to support the left and who are today the most affected 
by a crisis in public interest in politics leading to doubt, to disaffiliation, or voting for the 
National Front.  Interestingly very few undiluted Catholics vote for the extreme right.   
 
                                                 
10
 Michel Brulé in “L’appartenance religieuse et le vote (presidéntiel) du 5 septembre 1965” [Religious 
belonging and the presidential vote of September 5, 1965], Sondages, 28(2), 1966, p.17, shows that out of 
the population of regularly practicing Catholics (i.e. 23% of French people during this time period), 72% 
voted for General de Gaulle and for Jean Lecanuet (of the moderate right).  Out of the population of 
irregularly practicing Catholics (36% of the total population), the percentage decreased to 48% (versus 
23%) for the candidate François Mitterrand.  For non-practicing Catholics (27% of the total), the 
percentages were slightly in favor of the left: 34% voted for candidates of the right and 37% chose 
François Mitterrand. 
11
 « Niveau d’intégration au catholicisme et vote » [The level of Catholic integration and the vote], 
Données Sociales, Paris, INSEE, 1990. « Intégration au catholicisme, attitudes éthico-politiques et 
comportement électoral » [Integration and Catholicism, ethico-political attitudes and electoral behavior], 
in Les Cultures politiques des Français, opus cité, pp 209-235. 
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Some 51% of those who believe in the existence of God voted for the right in 1986, 
compared with 25% who voted for the left, whereas, 67% of atheists voted for the left.  
The more that the content of the Catholic faith is known and practiced, the higher the 
probability that the vote for the right will increase.  Yves Lambert proceeds through 
other avenues of inquiry and presents similar conclusions12, which cause us to think that 
electoral trends are not just related to “simple survival”, but have a strong ideological 
dimension13.  The religious variable remains a heavy one in political sociology in 
explaining votes for the right, as it is inexistent for people of no religious affiliation.  
Considering all of the percentages of Catholic votes between regularly practicing 
Catholics, monthly, occasional and non-practicing Catholics, predictions made over the 
last thirty years show a certain stability (Michelat, 1990).  The religious variable explains 
68% of the vote for the rights in 1966 and 70% in 1978.  It explains 65% of this vote in 
1997.  In a general sense, in pre-Enlargement Europe (i.e. the Europe of 15 members), 
non-religious people were more to the left than non-practicing religious people, who 
were more to the left than people who practiced religion, whatever the confession14.   
 
The continuation of an interventionist economic culture 
 
The most recent European vote reveals habits of mind deeply anchored among the 
French population which help to explain the rejection of the European Constitution in 
2005. France had helped to build a vision of Europe shaped to a considerable extent by 
Catholics which included a commitment to substantive social policies through of a 
consensus forged by Socialists and Christian-Democrats in the 1950s around a principle 
which is now referred to as “solidarity”, meaning policies designed to reduce social 
                                                 
12
 Yves Lambert « La religion : un paysage en profonde évolution », in Rifault H.dir. Les Valeurs des 
Français, PUF, 1994. 
13
 Michelat has thus shown that in 1997, the more that one was Catholic, the more one desired to see 
schools which favored discipline and effort.  This correlation relies on a survey question from the BVA 
survey of 2003 asking what schools should teach to children as a priority: the response was the same – 
discipline and effort at a rate of 59%. 
14
 B. Cautrès, « l’influence de la religion sur les attitudes politiques : essai d’analyse spatio-temporelle 
dans l’Union européenne », in P. Bréchon et B. Cautrès dir., Les enquêtes Eurobaromètres, analyse 
comparées des données socio-politiques, Paris l’Harmattan, 1998. 
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inequalities and eliminate social marginalization and exclusion, with a strong emphasis 
on equal opportunities and living conditions for all citizens in a Republic which is defined 
in article one of its constitution as “social” in nature. It was would be a grave misreading 
of the fabric of French society to overlook the fact that a vision of an economically 
“liberal” Europe and a presentation of the European Constitution in essentially 
commercial terms was bound to offend both practicing and non-practicing Catholics, 
who together represent 64 per cent of the electorate. 
 
In the 1994 European elections, when the electorate in general tended towards hostility 
to Europe, showing a general lack of confidence and optimism, practicing Catholics 
showed them to be “Euro-optimists”. That optimism had declined by the 1999 European 
elections, when the social policy dimension also seemed to be in decline in the most 
recent European treaties. The treaties seemed to simply enshrine the idea of Europe as 
an ever larger and more efficient market with no real political project be it towards the 
United States  or on questions of social justice and peace. In an exit poll, 61 per cent of 
French voters (and 62 per cent of Catholic voters) said they wanted a Europe that was 
more independent from the United States and with stronger social policies, in a word a 
European Welfare State. For Catholics as for the population as a whole, the top two 
priorities were the struggle against social inequalities and for greater personal security. 
If Europe were to pursue neither peace nor social justice, Europe would lose its purpose 
and its very soul. 15  
 
With hindsight we can see in those data (from 1999) the onset of what was to become 
the great disavowal of 2005. The majority of Catholics, like the majority of the 
population as a whole, voted against the Constitution in the name of their own 
European ideal and they showed themselves more and more sympathetic to Euro-
sceptics on both the left and the right, despite the attempts by most party leaderships 
to bring people back into line around a pro-European platform. 
                                                 
15
 LA Croix, sondage CSA-opinion, 15/06/99 
